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A. Proposed Legislation: Amendments to the
ECPA
B. Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Jones
Conclusion

Before the late 1980’s an individual never left home
without two essential items: their keys and wallet. Since that
time, a third item has emerged: the cell phone. In June 2011,
there were more than 320 million wireless subscribers in the
United States, which constitutes one-hundred-and-two
percent of the American population.1 In fact, twenty-nine
percent of all households in the United States are now
wireless only.2 Further, cellular service providers have
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1. Wireless Quick Facts: Mid-Year Figures, CTIA-THE WIRELESS
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323
(last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
2. Id.
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sought to make a cell phone user’s keys and wallet obsolete by
developing cell phones that double as both a car key and a
method of payment, so that all the user requires in his daily
life is his cell phone.3
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the cell phone is
that it is with us everywhere we go, making us available to
both our colleagues and loved ones, as well as making them—
and now the Internet—available to us.4 In addition, locationbased cell phone applications, such as Foursquare5 and the
“Places” feature on Facebook,6 have capitalized on the fact
that a cell phone is always with the user and the user’s desire
to share his location with others.7 In order for a cell phone to
properly function (i.e., make and receive calls or transmit
data) it must be in constant connection with the cellular
network.8 As a cell phone communicates with the nearest cell
towers, the cellular network records and stores this data,
called cell-site location information (CSLI) in order for the
network—and sometimes other users—to locate the cell
phone.9
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3. See Michael Fitzgerald, Use Your Cell Phone Instead of Your Credit
Card,
PC
WORLD,
(Sept.
19,
2005,
1:00
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/122590/use_your_cell_phone__instead_of_your_c
redit_card.html (reviewing various cell phone technologies that permit the user
to link their credit card to his cell phone and thereby use his cell as a means of
payment); Brian X. Chen, Japanese Cell Phone Doubles as Car Key, WIRED,
(Sept. 24, 2008, 5:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/09/
japanese-cell-p/ (reviewing a cell phone offering a car key function developed by
Sharp and Nissan).
4. See M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1413, 1413 (2007).
5. See FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011)
(allowing a user to “check in” at stores, restaurants, and other establishments,
share this information with friends and earn a “badge” for the frequency with
which the user visits those locations).
6. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/places/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2011) (allowing the user to utilize the location-based feature to “share where
they are,” “connect with friends” and “find local deals”).
7. See Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, 4% of online Americans use
location-based
services,
PEW
INTERNET
(Nov.
4,
2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Location-based-services.aspx (stating
that four percent of online Americans use location-based software services).
8. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary,
111th Cong. 40 (2010) [hereinafter May Hearings] (statement of Prof. Orin
Kerr).
9. See id.
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Because a cell phone is always with the user, the CSLI
records generated by a cellular network can provide a wealth
of information about the individual user.10 Understandably,
law enforcement considers CSLI to be a very powerful
investigative tool.11 Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith,
who testified before Congress in June 2010 and oversees
applications for CSLI, estimates that the total number of
electronic surveillance orders issued at the federal level
exceeds 10,000 per year.12 While early CSLI jurisprudence
focused on prospective (real-time) CSLI,13 recently the focus
has shifted to historical CSLI14 (the records of the
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10. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies
and Services: Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of
the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 60 (2010) [hereinafter June Hearings]
(statement of Richard Littlehale, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, F.B.I.).
11. See id.
12. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary,
111th Cong. 80 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, May Hearings] (statement of Hon.
Stephen Wm. Smith). The exact number of electronic surveillance orders
granted under the ECPA is unknown. Id. The Attorney General is required to
report to Congress the number of pen registers requested. 18 U.S.C. § 3126
(2011). There is no sister reporting requirement for information obtained under
§ 2703. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2011).
13. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of the Pen Register Device, a Trap and
Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Information, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301
(D.P.R. 2007); In re Application of the United States for an Order for
Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460
F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the release of Subscriber
and Other Information; and (3) authorizing the disclosure of Location-Based
Services, In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and
(3) Location of Cell Site Origination and/or Termination, Case Nos. 1:06-MC-6,
1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006); In re Application of The
United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re
Application of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application for Pen
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp.
2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see also Kevin McLaughlin, Note, Fourth Amendment
and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 421 (2007) (reviewing prospective CSLI jurisprudence).
14. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL
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communication between the cell phone and the cellular
network generated and retained by a cellular service
provider).15 When discussing historical CSLI, many early
cases and law review articles agreed that the information was
obtainable under a lesser standard of proof than prospective
CSLI.16
Recently, the Third Circuit became the first United
States Court of Appeals to decide what the appropriate
standard of proof was for law enforcement to obtain historical
CSLI under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and the
Fourth Amendment, but the mixed result of the case does not
answer the question convincingly.17 Frustrated by Fourth
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4200156 (N.D. Ga Apr. 21, 2008); In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Applications of the
United States of America for an Order Authorizing Continued use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace with Caller Identification Device and Cell Site
Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any Subsequently Assigned Tel. No.,
530 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Applications of the United States of
America for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d),
509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); see also Patrick T. Chamberlin, Note, Court
Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument
for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745 (2009) (reviewing
historical CSLI jurisprudence).
15. See May Hearings, supra note 8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr).
16. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 (denying defendant’s motion to
suppress historical CSLI evidence that had been ordered disclosed by a
magistrate judge under the Stored Communications Act standard); In re
Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.
Tex. 2007) (granting government access to both prospective and historical
CSLI); In re Applications of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing Continued use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace with Caller
Identification Device and Cell Site Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any
Subsequently Assigned Tel. No., 530 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2007) (denying
government access to prospective CSLI and granting government access to
historical CSLI); In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76
(D. Mass. 2007) (granting government access to historical CSLI); see also Adam
Koppel, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1068–69 (2010) (stating that historical CSLI is limited in
value and produces a lower level of concern from privacy advocates).
17. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the SCA provides a “sliding
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Amendment precedent and the current statutory framework,
the Third Circuit concluded: “The considerations for and
against such a requirement [a lesser standard of proof for
historical CSLI] would be for Congress to balance. A court is
not the appropriate forum for such balancing, and we decline
to take a step as to which Congress is silent.”18
Congress answered that call.
In May, June, and
September of 2010, Congress held fact-finding hearings to
determine what changes needed to be made to the existing
statutory framework.19 The goals of Congress in creating new
legislation on this topic were to balance an individual’s right
to privacy with the government’s need to obtain evidence to
prevent and investigate crime and respond to emergency
circumstances.20 In May 2011, Senator Leahy of the Senate
Judiciary Committee introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to
amend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (of which
the SCA is a smaller part).21 The legislation has been sent to
the Senate Judiciary Committee and is currently being
considered in the 112th Congress, First Session.22 The
potential impact of the proposed legislation will be discussed
in Part III.A.
In addition, just before publication of this Comment the
Supreme Court issued its decision in the GPS tracking case
United States v. Jones (formerly known as United States v.
Maynard).
The Court’s decision in that case and the
implications of the decision for historical CSLI jurisprudence
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 149 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

scale” by which a judge can, at his or her discretion, grant an order for historical
CSLI or require a warrant).
18. Id. at 319.
19. See May Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr); June
Hearings, supra note 10; The Electronic Communications Privacy Act:
Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter September Hearings].
20. September Hearings, supra note 19, Prepared Statement at 1
(Statement of James X. Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and
Technology) available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-09-22Dempsey
Testimony.pdf. Another goal of Congress is to instill consumer confidence in
communications technology. Id.
21. Rachelle Dragani, US Senate Sinks its Teeth into Online Privacy
Reform, TECHNEWSWORLD (May 18, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.technews
world.com/story/72477.html.
22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1011, 112th Cong. (2011).
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23. Text messages are outside the scope of this Comment: law enforcement
requests for historical CSLI often do not request text message information. See
supra notes 13, 14, 16.
24. See infra pp. 11–12.
25. See infra pp. 11–12.
26. See infra Part I.A–B.
27. See infra Part I.C–E.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.A.4–B.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Conclusion.
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will be discussed in Part III.B.
The subject of this Comment is historical CSLI generated
through cell phone calls.23 Using the current statutory
framework, Fourth Amendment precedent, and previous
CSLI case law, this Comment suggests a new legal
framework for the standard of proof required to obtain
historical CSLI. This approach focuses on the user’s active
versus idle use of a cell phone. When a phone is in active
use—such as when making or receiving a call—the
information should be obtainable under a “specific and
articulable facts standard,” which is a lesser standard of proof
than for a warrant.24 However, when the phone is idle, the
data generated by the cellular network should only be
accessible under a probable cause standard.25 An active use
distinction will help to simplify how the current statutory
framework is applied to historical CSLI and provide a
workable solution that comfortably meshes with the existing
statutes.
In addition, this proposal will unify Fourth
Amendment precedents that at times conflict.
First, Section I will discuss how the technology of CSLI
works, what kind of data is stored by cellular service
providers, what changes can be expected from advancements
in future technology, and how law enforcement uses the
data.26 Next, the Comment will discuss the current statutory
framework, Fourth Amendment precedent, and existing
historical CSLI jurisprudence.27 Section II will identify the
legal problem to be discussed28 and will analyze historical
CSLI under the existing statutory framework and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.29 Section III will discuss the
proposed solution to the current legal problem30 followed by
the conclusion.31
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION: WHAT IS HISTORICAL CELLSITE LOCATION INFORMATION?

A. How Cell Phones Connect to the Cellular Network
In order for the cellular network to connect incoming
calls to a user’s cell phone and for the user to make outgoing
calls, the cell phone must constantly relay its location to the
nearest cell tower32 and other towers close by.33 Each phone
has a Mobile Identification Number (MIN)—a ten-digit
number that another user dials to call the phone; and an
Electronic Serial Number (ESN)—a unique, unchangeable
number assigned by the manufacturer.34 Through a process
called “registration,” which occurs approximately every seven
seconds, a cell phone identifies itself to the cellular network
by relaying its MIN and ESN to the nearest tower and other
towers nearby.35 The phone registers with the cell tower that
has the strongest radio signal, as well as up to six other cell
towers nearby.36 The cell phone then sorts and ranks these
towers according to which signal is the strongest and the
weakest.37
This
process
occurs
continuously
and
automatically as long as the phone is turned on.38 The signals
sent during registration are transmitted on a separate
frequency, distinct from those that transmit voice and data to

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B
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32. The basic composition of a cell phone network is a series of grids and
networks. The cell tower (base station) is the smallest part of each grid, which
is controlled by a base station controller. Each base station controller reports to
a larger network called a Location Area Code (LAC). Each LAC could contain
anywhere from 100 to 125 cell towers, and is controlled by a mobile switching
center (MTSO), where all types of data are recorded. Transcript of Record at 7–
8, United States v. Sims, No. 06-674 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (testimony of
William Shute), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking
/shutetestimony.pdf [hereinafter Shute Testimony].
33. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426.
34. See Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309
[hereinafter Who Knows Where You’ve Been].
35. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13
(statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).
36. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; June Hearings, supra note 10, at
13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).
37. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze);
Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 11.
38. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426.
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the phone.39 As the user and the phone move through the
cellular network, the cell phone continually sorts and ranks
the nearest cell towers as the connection to one tower grows
weaker and the connection to another tower grows stronger.
This information is used by the cellular-telephone service
provider (CSP) to locate the phone within the cellular
network whenever the cell phone receives a call.40 When the
user is called, the CSP sends a signal through the entire
cellular network, which locates the phone based on where it
last registered.41 A similar process works in reverse when the
user makes a call.42
1. The Level of Information Retained and Stored by
Cellular Service Providers
Historical CSLI is “non-content” information: information
that the cellular network generates and uses in order to
deliver the call, as opposed to the content of the
conversation.43
Every cellular-telephone service provider
(CSP) stores this information, but the amount of information
stored by each CSP depends on the technology,44 and the
business decisions that each company makes regarding data
retention.45 Historical CSLI stored by wireless providers can

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 151 Side A
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39. Id.
40. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at
8; June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). The cell
towers measure the strength of the signal using either one or both of the two
methods to measure the signal strength, Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) or
Angle of Arrival (AOA). TDOA measures the amount of time that it takes for
the signal from a tower to travel to a user’s phone, and from this measurement
it is possible to estimate the distance between the tower and phone because
radio waves move at a constant rate. AOA measures the angle at which the
phone’s signal arrives at the tower and uses that information to calculate the
approximate location of the phone. Based on these measurements, the MTSO
will then direct the phone to switch to the nearest tower with the strongest
signal. See Who Knows Where You’ve Been, supra note 34, at 308–09.
41. See Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 8.
42. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426.
43. See May Hearings, supra note 8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr).
44. Most, if not all cellular telephone service providers (CSPs) use one of
three different technologies, which all operate in essentially the same fashion.
T-Mobile and AT&T use Global Standard Mobile Communications (GSM),
Verizon and Sprint use Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Nextel uses
Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (IDEN). Shute Testimony, supra note 32,
at 4–5.
45. Id.
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be separated into two categories: limited CSLI, which is the
data created during the beginning and end of a call, and
unlimited CSLI, which is all of the signaling information
collected during the call and when the phone is idle.46
While most, if not all, wireless providers record and store
limited CSLI,47 others may also store unlimited CSLI48—
including regularly updated, accurate location information.49
As an example of what kind of information is stored, in 2009
Nextel stored the date, time, and duration of the calls as well
as the cell tower when the call is made, the cell tower in the
event of a change, and the cell tower when the call is
terminated.50 Historical CSLI is stored for long periods of
time because it is extremely useful to CSP.51
This
information is used by CSPs for business, marketing and
technical purposes.52
2. Current Cell Tower Configurations and Continued
Growth
Cell towers can only handle a certain number of calls at a
given time depending on the amount of radio spectrum
bandwidth allocated to the CSP.53 As a result, in more

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 151 Side B
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46. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 99 (statement of Hon. Stephen Wm.
Smith).
47. See Albert Gidari, Jr., Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 549 (2007).
48. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 42 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elecsur-manual.pdf.
49. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 27 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).
50. Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 10, 12–13. Additionally, how long
the data is stored depends on the service provider and the technology. In
general, given the low cost of storing data and the invaluable use of the data
(discussed below), many service providers store the data as long as possible.
Some providers divide their records into two classes: “billing records,” which
comprise the records of incoming and outgoing calls and the tower location that
served them, and “maintenance records,” which may include far more detailed
information, such as records of when subscribers’ handsets move through the
network even when no calls are being made. See also May Hearings, supra note
8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr); June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16, 135
(statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).
51. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).
52. Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 10. Technically, the information
tells CSP’s where old infrastructure is redundant and where new infrastructure
is needed. Marketing and business wise, the information is used to see how
customers are using their phones. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16, 95.
53. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 15, 26.
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densely populated areas, the cell towers must be closer
together in order to accommodate the increased number of
users in that area.54 New cellular data services such as 3G
and 4G internet create similar pressure on the available
spectrum bandwidth, usually requiring more densely
populated cell towers.55 In rural areas, there may be cell
towers in a configuration covering several miles in diameter;
but the trend in urban areas has been to install cell towers in
increasingly smaller service areas called microcells, picocells
and femtocells, which serve very specific locations, such as a
floor of a building or even an individual room, such as a
waiting room.56
B. Law Enforcement Uses of Cell-Site Location Information:
What Does it all Mean?
First, it is important to understand what kind of
information is sought by law enforcement from CSPs through
the SCA. Law enforcement requests for CSLI vary greatly.
Sometimes historical CSLI requests are only for limited
CSLI57 and other times are for unlimited CSLI as well;58 other
orders can be unclear as to what kind of information is being

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 152 Side A
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54. Id.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 15–16.
57. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info.,
411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (W.D. La. 2006) (requesting “the location of the cell
site/sector (physical address) at call origination (for outbound calling), call
termination (for incoming calls) and, if reasonably available, during the
progress of a call for the subject telephone number.”).
58. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Each application identically
defined the requested information as ’the antenna tower and sector to which the
cell phone sends its signal, specifically including the cellsite/sector(s) used by
the mobile telephone to obtain service for a call or when in an idle state.’ In
other words, the Government seeks continuous location data to track the target
phone over a two month period, whether the phone was in active use or not.”);
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 412 n.1
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (stating in the request that “call detail records also include a
record of incoming calls and the cellsite/sector(s) used by the mobile telephone
to obtain service for a call or when in an idle state.”).
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requested.59 The time period over which CSLI records are
requested can also vary dramatically.60
CSLI is most useful to law enforcement to show with
whom a suspect communicates, from where, at what time,
and for how long.61 Law enforcement analyzes historical
CSLI by looking at what cell tower the phone is
communicating with, and what the signal strength of that call
was.62 If the phone communicates with a single tower during
the entire duration of the call, the phone is in very close
proximity to the tower.63 If the phone shifts between two
different cell towers during the course of a call, the phone is
in the middle of an overlapping area of coverage between the
two different cell towers.64 The advantages of using CSLI as
opposed to other location-based technologies is that many, if
not all, adults already have a cell phone and law enforcement
is therefore spared the trouble of having to install the device
on the suspect’s car or person.65 CSLI is useful in instances
where law enforcement does not yet have probable cause (the
standard of proof required for a warrant).66 This information
is often used as a “stepping stone” for officers to request
authorization from courts for more intrusive types of
surveillance and searches, such as a wiretap authorized by a
warrant.67
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59. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for an Order:
(1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571 (W.D. Tex. 2010)
(failing to adequately state what kind of CSLI is being requested).
60. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113,
2011 WL 679925 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (requesting a 3 day period, a 6 day
period, and a 12 day period); In re Application of the United States of America
for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) (requesting 113
days).
61. September Hearings, supra note 19, at 59 (statement of James A. Baker,
Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.).
62. See Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 19–20.
63. See id. at 22.
64. See id. at 8.
65. See Clark, supra note 4, at 1413.
66. See id. at 1414.
67. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of Richard Littlehale,
Assistant SAC, F.B.I.); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act:
Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 112th Cong. 4
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C. Stored Communications Act: Law Enforcement Access to
Historical Cell-Site Location Information
To acquire historical CSLI law enforcement must obtain
a court order requiring a CSP to disclose the information.68
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), known as the Stored Communications Act, regulates
government access to wire and electronic communications.69
The standard of proof required under the SCA for law
enforcement to obtain historical CSLI, as well as the precise
application of the statute to historical CSLI remains
uncertain. First, an overview of the statutory scheme is
essential.
The primary statute that governs the disclosure of CSLI
is 18 U.S.C. § 2703.70 Section 2703(c)(1) provides in pertinent
part:
(c) Records concerning electronic communication service or
remote computing service. (1) A governmental entity may
require a provider of electronic communication service or
remote computing service to disclose a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of
such
service
(not
including
the
contents
of
communications) . . . .71

04/16/2012 17:10:32

(2011) [hereinafter April Hearings] (statement of James A. Baker, Associate
Deputy Att’y Gen.).
68. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 428.
69. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of F. James
Sensenbrenner, Rep. WI).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2011).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) 2011 (emphasis added).
72. In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Pursuant
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79–80 (D.
Mass. 2007). Content information is governed by sections 2703(a)(b). See 18
U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2011).
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In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(1), three qualifications must be met: first, the CSP
must be a provider of an electronic communication service;
second, the data may not be content information as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of” an electronic communications service.72
First, the CSP must be a provider of an “electronic
communication service.” Under the SCA, in order to qualify
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as an electronic communications service provider the CSP
must provide users with the ability to “send or receive wire or
electronic communications.”73 A wire communication is:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception . . . furnished or
operated by any person engaged in providing or operating
such facilities . . . .74

04/16/2012 17:10:32

73. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2011).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
76. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
79–80 (D. Mass. 2007).
77. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2010); Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 1775–76.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2011).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2011).
80. In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Pursuant
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.
Mass. 2007).
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The Act defines an electronic communication as “any transfer
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system.”75
There is little debate that historical CSLI qualifies as one or
both of these definitions,76 but which definition CSLI is
categorized as has been the subject of litigation.77 Second the
data may not be content information under the meaning of
the SCA. The SCA defines content as “any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
Historical CSLI falls outside of the
communication.”78
definition of content, and instead is classified as a “record
or other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . or
customer.”79
Third, the data must be a “record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of,” an electronic
communications service.80 Neither the term “record” nor
“information” is defined by the SCA, but in the relevant
context courts have found record to mean something stored or
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archived, and information to mean data.81 Finding that
stored CSLI data recorded from a cell tower is a record and
that CSLI data is information, courts have found that CSLI is
a “record or other information.”82 While most courts agree
that historical CSLI is obtainable under the SCA, there is
disagreement over the standard of proof required.
1. Standard of Proof: What Level of Proof Must Law
Enforcement Show?
Historical CSLI is available under § 2703(c)(1) only when
law enforcement: (A) obtains a warrant, or (B) obtains a court
order under § 2703(d) (a “section (d) order”).83 The § 2703(d)
standard of proof required for a court order under §
2703(c)(1)(B) is:
(d) Requirements for court order. A court order for
disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental entity
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.84

04/16/2012 17:10:32

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2011).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2011) (emphasis added).
85. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). A pen register is a device or process which records the
telephone numbers of outgoing calls. A trap-and-trace device captures the
telephone numbers of incoming calls. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2011).
86. See notes 87–89 and accompanying test (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3117
exception to the definition of electronic communication).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2011).
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This standard is an intermediate standard, less than that of a
probable cause, but more than required for a pen register or
trap-and-trace device.85
While the standard of proof for both wire communication
and electronic communication is the same, there is good
reason for the government and the courts to be careful about
how the information sought is classified.86 Under the SCA,
any communication from a “tracking device” is excluded from
the definition of “electronic communication.”87 Section 3117
defines a tracking device as: “an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a
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person or object.”88 Therefore, if the “electronic
communication” sought under § 2703(c)(1) is information
derived from a device which “permits the tracking of
movement of a person or object” that electronic
communication cannot be obtained under § 2703(c)(1).89
2. Legislative History: The Scope of the Stored
Communications Act
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) which updated
18 U.S.C. § 2703 to its current state.90 During Senate and
House hearings for CALEA, then-Director of the FBI Louis
Freeh testified regarding the purpose of the bill.91 Director
Freeh stated that “[l]aw enforcement’s requirements set forth
in proposed legislation include an ability to acquire ‘call setup
information.’ This information relates to dialing type
information—information generated by a caller which
identifies the origin, duration, and destination of a wire
communication,
the
telephone
number
or
similar
communication address.”92 When asked whether or not this
information could be used to locate an individual, Director
Freeh stated:

The legislative intent of CALEA and the meaning of Director
Freeh’s testimony has been the subject of debate for courts.94
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88. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2011).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2011).
90. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
91. Louis J. Freeh, Director, F.B.I., Police Access to Advanced
Communication Systems: S. J. Judiciary on Tech., Law, Civil and
Constitutional Rights (Mar. 18, 1994), reprinted in Federal Document Clearing
House, 1994 WL 223962 *33.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
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Some cellular carriers do acquire information relating to
the general location of a cellular telephone for call
distribution analysis purposes. However, this information
is not the specific type of information obtained from “true”
tracking devices, which can require a warrant or court
order when used to track within a private location not
open to public view.93
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Some courts have interpreted Director Freeh’s testimony to
mean that a warrant is required to obtain historical CSLI,
while other courts have interpreted the testimony to say that
a section (d) order is sufficient.
D. Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides,
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”95 In order to determine
whether a search has taken place for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Katz that there is a twofold analysis: first, did the person
have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second,
was that expectation one that society is prepared to recognize
as objectively reasonable.96 The Supreme Court further
elaborated that the home is a place where individuals have a
subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable
in the view of society.97 Because there is no Supreme Court
authority directly on point, courts have analogized historical
CSLI to other lines of cases. One area of case law focuses on
the disclosure of information to third parties, another area
focuses on electronic surveillance through the use of
“beepers,” and other courts have found the prolonged
surveillance doctrine announced in United States v. Maynard
persuasive.
Assumption of the Risk: Third Party Disclosure

Under the Fourth Amendment a “person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he

04/16/2012 17:10:32

Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Application for Pen Register and
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 763
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Katz, government agents intercepted the contents of a telephone
conversation by attaching an electronic listening device to a public telephone
booth. The Court found that Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy while
using the telephone booth and that the government’s activity of listening to and
recording his words was a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 353; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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2. Use of Electronic Surveillance to Track a Suspect: The
Beeper Cases
Other courts have sought guidance from the beeper cases
to determine if a cell phone user has a reasonable expectation
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
Id. at 735, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
Id.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
See id. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743–44 (internal citations omitted).

04/16/2012 17:10:32

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”98 The Supreme Court
has found that where a person has voluntarily conveyed
certain information to a third party, he or she has assumed
the risk that the third party could disclose the information to
law enforcement.99 For example, in United States v. Miller
the Supreme Court found that the customer of a bank did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial
documents that he voluntarily conveyed to the bank.100 The
Court found that the customer assumed the risk that those
records could be accessible by the government, even if that
information was revealed to the bank on the assumption that
it will only be used for a limited purpose and in confidence.101
Further, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court found
that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed records
of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and
therefore assumed the risk that those records would be
revealed to the police.102 First, the Court distinguished Katz,
stating that pen registers did not acquire the contents of
communications.103 Second, the Court held that the telephone
user had no subjective expectation of privacy because “[a]ll
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed.”104 In addition, the user of the phone did not have
an objective expectation of privacy because this expectation
was not “one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’ ” 105 Whether the assumption of the risk doctrine
applies to historical CSLI has been a subject of litigation in
courts.
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106. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
107. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
108. Id. at 281.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 282.
111. See infra Part I.D.3.
112. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–09.
113. Id. at 714.
114. Id. at 715.
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of privacy in his CSLI records. The beeper cases concerned
the use of tracking devices for surveillance purposes and
whether they infringed upon a reasonable expectation of
privacy and therefore constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.106 In United States v.
Knotts, the police used a radio transmitter, called a “beeper,”
to track the movement of the suspect on public roadways.107
The Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated.108 The government surveillance
conducted through the use of the beeper amounted to no more
than following the defendant’s car on public streets and
highways - an area where a person did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.109 The Court further added that the
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit police from augmenting
what they could normally have observed (the car on public
streets) with the use of technology (the beeper).110
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court imposed an
important limitation on its holding in Knotts.111 In United
States v. Karo, the government used a beeper in a similar
fashion to Knotts by installing the device in a can of ether.112
There, the Court found that the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated because agents used the
beeper to determine that the chemicals were inside the
interior of the suspect’s home, an area where the suspect had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.113 The Supreme Court
found that the use of technology to gather information about
the interior of the home distinguished the case from Knotts,
as the information gathered in Karo could not have been
visually verified.114 The beeper cases have led courts to
consider two questions with respect to CSLI: is historical
CSLI sufficiently analogous to a beeper for Knotts and Karo to
control, and does historical CSLI invade the privacy of the
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home?
3.

The Prolonged Surveillance Doctrine: Does the
Duration of the Surveillance Matter?

04/16/2012 17:10:32

115. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (2010), reh’g en banc denied sub
nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 3064.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 555–56.
118. Id. at 563–64.
119. Id. at 558.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 544.
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Recently, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion that has
been very influential in historical CSLI cases. In United
States v. Maynard, the police fixed a GPS tracking device to
the defendant’s automobile without a warrant.115
In
Maynard, the court did not concentrate on the location of the
surveillance (roadways or the home), but instead focused on
the duration of the surveillance.116
The D.C. Circuit
concluded that Knotts was not controlling under the facts of
the case, reasoning that in Knotts the Supreme Court
distinguished between limited information obtained from a
beeper (movements during a discrete journey), and more
sustained and continuous monitoring, such as with the
defendant in Maynard.117 The court found that the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz,118
reasoning that his continuous movements—twenty-four hours
a day over the course of twenty-eight days—were not exposed
to the public.119 The court further held that the whole of one’s
movements over the course of a month were not exposed to
the public, because there was zero likelihood that anyone,
including police, would observe all of those movements.120
The court then reasoned that the entirety of defendant’s
movements revealed more than each individual movement,
and that the whole was therefore greater than the sum of its
parts—the entire picture of defendant’s actions over the
course of a month.121
However, it is important to note that all courts have not
accepted this doctrine. In United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
the Ninth Circuit declined to find the use of a GPS tracking
device, used in a similar fashion to Maynard, was an
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impermissible search.122 “The only information the agents
obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations
where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents
could have obtained by following the car.”123
Using the assumption of the risk doctrine, the beeper
cases, and the prolonged surveillance doctrine, courts have
attempted to analyze whether law enforcement use of
historical CSLI is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and therefore requires a warrant based on
probable cause.
E. Historical CSLI Case Law: The Search for a Statutory
and Fourth Amendment Solution
1. Early CSLI Jurisprudence

04/16/2012 17:10:32

122. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010),
reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
123. Id. This decision was the subject of a scathing dissent by Chief Judge
Kozinksi in which he evoked images of 1984’s Oceania. Pineda-Moreno, 617
F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
124. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
79-80 (D. Mass. 2007); HON. JAMES CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, 1 LAW OF
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:84, ACQUISITION OF CELL SITE LOCATION DATA
(Sept. 2011) (listing all of the early pro (d) order CSLI decisions). See also supra
note 14 and accompanying cases.
125. See In re Applications of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing Continued use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace with Caller
Identification Device and Cell Site Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any
Subsequently Assigned Tel. No., 530 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (D. Mass. 2007).
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In many historical CSLI applications, the court
undertakes a two step analysis: (1) is historical CSLI
obtainable under the SCA; and if so, (2) does the acquisition
of historical CSLI require a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment. In the early discussion of CSLI, many cases and
law review articles agreed that historical CSLI, as a “record
or other information,” was obtainable under a § 2703(d)
showing of “specific and articulable facts.”124 In some cases,
historical CSLI was allowed under the statutory and Fourth
Amendment framework even though prospective CSLI was
denied.125
Early historical CSLI cases largely found that the user of
a cell phone did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
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under the “assumption of the risk” framework.126 A typical
example is United States v. Suarez-Blanca, where the Court
found that although a cell phone user might have a subjective
expectation of privacy with respect to CSLI,127 this
expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable under
the assumption of the risk doctrine.128 Further, these early
CSLI cases did not find that the accuracy of surveillance
conducted was sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment
under Karo because CSLI did not indicate the location of
defendants in the home or other private locations. 129
2.

Current CSLI: Statutory and Fourth Amendment
Challenges

Historical CSLI began to receive greater attention in
2008 when Magistrate Judge Lenihan authored the opinion
that was the subject of appeal in the Third Circuit.130 In a
rare showing of solidarity, the opinion was also signed by four
other magistrate judges.131 Judge Lenihan’s decision found
that historical CSLI could not be obtained without a showing
of probable cause.132 That opinion and other historical CSLI
decisions that found a showing of probable cause was
necessary first concentrated on the tracking device exception
to the definition of electronic communication under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117.133 Some of these cases concluded that historical CSLI
was information from a tracking device and therefore
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 157 Side B
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126. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 at *8–9.
127. Id. at *8 n.7.
128. See id. at *8–9.
129. Id. at *11.
130. See In re Application of the United States of America for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to
the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, (W.D. Pa. 2008), vacated 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.
2010).
131. Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET, (Feb. 11,
2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10451518-38.html.
132. Id.
133. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2010), In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3)
Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 577
(W.D. Tex. 2010).
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unobtainable under § 2703(c)(1).134 The application of § 3117
to historical CSLI is discussed in Part II.A.3 but continues to
be litigated in courts.135
Other pro-warrant historical CSLI cases found the
prolonged surveillance doctrine of Maynard persuasive in two
contexts. First, that Knotts is not dispositive on the issue of
prolonged location tracking, and second, that a cell phone
user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
continuous movements over the course of a prolonged period
of time.136 However, there are still other cases that found
that historical CSLI is obtained under the assumption of the
risk doctrine.137
3. Third Circuit: The Sliding Scale Compromise
Recently, the Third Circuit became the first United
States Court of Appeals to address the issue of whether
historical CSLI is obtainable under the SCA, and under what
standard of proof.138 Rather than find that either a section (d)
order or a warrant obtainable under a probable cause

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 158 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

134. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 575 (W.D. Tex.
2010).
135. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3)
Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 571
(W.D. Tex. 2010).
136. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MC-0897,
2010 WL 5437209, at *1 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010); In re Application of the
United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838
(S.D. Tex. 2010); see also In re Application of the United States of America for
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F.
Supp. 2d 578, 581–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing in
greater detail the application of the prolonged surveillance doctrine to historical
CSLI by Judge Orenstein).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at
*3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d in part, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010).
138. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304
(3d Cir. 2010).
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139. Id. at 319.
140. See id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 315–16.
142. Id. at 316. The example given by the court is “a team may win the
World Series only if it makes the playoffs;” a team meeting the necessary
condition to winning the World Series, making the playoffs, does not guarantee
that the team will win the World Series. In contrast, “a team will make the
playoffs if it wins its division;” Id. (“[W]inning the division is a sufficient
condition to making the playoffs because a team that wins the division is
ensured a spot in the playoffs.”).
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 310.
145. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
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standard was sufficient, the court found that § 2703(d)
created a “sliding scale” by which a magistrate judge could, at
his or her discretion, require the government to obtain a
warrant or a section (d) order.139 The court began by
analyzing the language of § 2703(d), which states that a
“ ‘ court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be
issued by any court . . . and shall issue only if’ the
intermediate [section (d)] standard is met.”140 The court
found that the language “may issue” implied court discretion
and that this implication was strengthened by the language
“only if,” in the same sentence.141 The court reasoned that the
words “only if” described a necessary, not sufficient, condition
such that a showing of “specific and articulable facts” was
necessary, but not automatically sufficient to grant a request
for historical CSLI.142
In addition, the court avoided the issue of whether
historical CSLI was information from a tracking device under
18 U.S.C. § 3117 and therefore exempt from the definition of
an “electronic communication” by classifying the data as
derived from a “wire communication,” which does not have
the same tracking device exception.143 The Court reasoned
historical CSLI requested by the government consisted of
“records of information collected by cell towers when a
subscriber makes a cellular phone call” and that the
“historical record is derived from ‘wire communication’ and
does not constitute an ‘electronic communication.’ ” 144
Further, the court examined the legislative history of
CALEA, the SCA and, more specifically, the testimony of
Louis Freeh, and found that such testimony did not preclude
providing CSLI under a section (d) standard.145 The court
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instead found that the legislative history and Freeh’s
testimony supported the notion that the new standard in
1986 was an intermediate standard.146 The court reasoned
that Freeh’s testimony focused on the government’s ability to
obtain the information through a pen register or trap-andtrace device, which was governed by a different, and lower
standard than a section (d) order.147
One of the most important developments to come out of
the Third Circuit’s decision was the court’s outright rejection
of the assumption of the risk doctrine. The Court stated that
“[a] cell phone customer has not voluntarily shared his
location information with a cellular provider in any
meaningful way,” reasoning that “it is unlikely that cell
phone customers are aware that their cell phones providers
collect and store historical location information.”148 However,
the court ultimately did not find that there were sufficient
facts to implicate the privacy of the home and thereby require
a warrant under Karo.149 “There is no evidence in this record
that historical CSLI, even when focused on cell phones that
are equipped with GPS, extends to that realm [of the interior
of the home].”150 Therefore, the court declined to find that
historical CSLI by definition, required a probable cause
showing in order to be obtained by law enforcement.151
II. ANALYSIS: IS A WARRANT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN
HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION?

Currently the SCA is out of date and contains internal
contradictions.152 Unclear legal standards, highlighted by the
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a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 317.
149. See id. at 312.
150. Id. at 312–13.
151. Id. at 313.
152. See id. at 319; September Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (Statement of
James X. Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and Technology).
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Third Circuit’s “sliding scale” compromise,153 have led to
confused magistrate judges attempting to interpret the
statute, uncertain standards for government access to the
information, and resources wasted on litigation of the issue.154
1. Section 2703(d) “Sliding Scale”: Is a Showing of
Specific and Articulable Facts Enough?
As stated in Part I.E.3, the Third Circuit found that §
2703(d) contained a “sliding scale” standard of proof whereby
a judge or magistrate was permitted but not required to grant
a request for historical CSLI under a section (d) order.155
Focusing on the word “may,” the court and other advocates of
this interpretation argue that the “sliding scale” is a
“permissive” reading of § 2703(d), required by the statute’s
plain language, the rule of constitutional avoidance, and
Congress’ intent to provide courts with a statutory “safetyvalve” to avoid issuing orders that may violate the Fourth
Amendment.156 Advocates of this interpretation argue that
the statute contains the words “shall . . . only if” rather than
simply “shall . . . if,” which must mean that a showing of
“specific and articulable facts” is necessary, not sufficient.157
Otherwise, the statute would read: “[A] court order for
disclosure . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if” the [section (d)]
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153. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010).
154. See September Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (Statement of James X.
Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and Technology).
155. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010).
156. Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Affirmance of the Dist. Ct. at 14. In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL
3866619 at *6. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance states that where there
are two possible readings of the statute, one of which could raise Fourth
Amendment concerns, the other must be adopted so long as a reading of the
statute is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. See Ian James Samuel,
Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1337 (2008).
157. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010).
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standard is met.158 According to this view, in order for the
word “only” to have meaning, it must be permissive and not
mandatory.159
The government and other advocates that believe a
showing of “articulable facts” is sufficient concentrate on the
First, advocates of this interpretation
word “shall.”160
emphasize that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
statute should control.161 Further, advocates argue that §
2703(d) does not mention, or even imply, that a probable
cause determination may be required.162 Therefore, all that is
required under § 2703(d) and the plain meaning of the statute
is a showing of “specific and articulable facts.”163
Next, these advocates state that the word “shall” is the
language of mandate,164 and that any other reading
emphasizing “may issue” in turn makes the words “shall
issue” superfluous.165 Lastly, these advocates state that the
“sliding scale” permissive reading of the statute ignores the
overall purpose of section (d)—to allow the government to
obtain non-content customer information without having to
show probable cause.166
In its opinion, the Third Circuit admitted that there is an
“internal contradiction” in the statute and asked Congress to
remedy the contradiction:
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158. See id. at 315.
159. See Brief for Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 156, at *1–3.
160. See Gov’t Reply Brief at 8, In re Application of the United States for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Ser. to Disclose Records to the
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL 3866620 at *10.
161. See Brief for the United States at 23, In re Application of the United
States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Ser. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL
3866618.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. Gov’t Reply Brief, supra note 160, at *12.
166. Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at *23.
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intention clear. A review of the statutory language
suggests that the Government can proceed to obtain
records pertaining to a subscriber by several routes, one
being a warrant with its underlying requirement of
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probable cause and the second being an order under
§2703(d). There is an inherent contradiction in the
statute or at least an underlying omission.167

This debate highlights the need for legislative change in the
text of the statute. Whether the legislature intended for a
statutory “safety valve,” or instead intended for a section (d)
standard to be sufficient, that intention should be made clear.
2. Wire Communication vs. Electronic Communication:
What Kind of Information is Cell-Site Location
Information?

04/16/2012 17:10:32

167. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
168. See supra Part I.C–I.C.1. (discussing the exclusion of data from the
definition of “wire communication” if that data can be classified as information
derived from a tracking device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2011).
170. Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 17, n.13; 18 U.S.C. §
2510(1) (2011).
171. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 17, n.13; 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12) (2011).
172. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010).
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A determination of whether historical CSLI is a wire
communication or an electronic communication has serious
consequences.168 Under § 3117, if historical CSLI is classified
as an electronic communication, the data could be excluded
from disclosure under § 2703(c)(1) because an electronic
communication, as defined by the SCA, cannot be information
derived from a tracking device.169 The problem is that
historical CSLI could qualify as either a wire or an electronic
communication.
There are several reasons why historical CSLI could
qualify as a wire communication. First the definition of wire
communication in the SCA includes the transmission of the
human voice,170 whereas the definition of electronic
communication does not.171 Further, because historical CSLI
requests consist of records of information collected by cell
towers when a user makes a phone call, the historical data
derives from a wire communication.172 The legislative history
of the definition of wire communication also bolsters this
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argument: “cellular communications—whether they are
between two cellular telephones or between a cellular
telephone and a ‘land line’ telephone—are included in the
definition of ‘wire communications’ and are covered by the
statute.”173
However, CSLI could also qualify as an electronic
communication.
An electronic communication is “any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio. . . .”174 Therefore, it is possible that CSLI is an
electronic communication because it is not transmitted by “by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection.”175
While the specific language in the definition of electronic
communication appears persuasive, it ignores the legislative
intent of the definition of wire communication to include all
cellular communications in the definition of wire
communication.176 This Comment’s proposal, to separate the
standard of proof for historical CSLI between “active use” and
“idle use,” would help to clarify the distinction between wire
communication and electronic communication.
Data
transmitted during a call would constitute an “aural transfer”
and would more comfortably fit within the definition of “wire
communication.”177 On the other hand, idle use data, data
transmitted by the network while the phone is idle, would
more comfortably fit the definition of electronic
communication.178

If CSLI is classified as an electronic communication
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) it must be determined whether a
cell phone is a tracking device as defined by § 3117. If so,
CSLI would be excluded from the definition of electronic
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173. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3565 [hereinafter CALEA Hearings].
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2011); see also Chamberlain, supra note 14, at
1757 n.72.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2011); see also Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1757
n.71.
176. See CALEA Hearings, supra note 173, at 11.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2011).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2011).
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communication and therefore would not obtainable under §
Perhaps best representing the belief that
2703(c)(1).179
historical CSLI is excluded from disclosure under the SCA as
information derived from a tracking device is Judge Andrew
W. Austin who stated: “The bottom line is that cell phones
undoubtedly have become ‘electronic . . . device[s] which
permit[] the tracking of the movement of a person or object.’
They are tracking devices.”180 Even if one does not feel as
strongly as Judge Austin, the definition of a tracking device
as stated in the CALEA hearings in 1986, is very broad:
These are one-way radio communication devices that emit
a signal on a specific radio frequency. This signal can be
received by special tracking equipment, and allows the
user to trace the geographical location of the transponder.
Such “homing” devices are used by law enforcement
personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the
sending unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on
a person, or in some other item.181

In the above definition, there are no specific requirements
regarding the accuracy of the device.182 Further, a device is
covered under the above definition even if it was not intended
or designed to track a person’s movements.183
However, upon examination of the language of the
statute and the traditional uses of a tracking device at the
time the statute was enacted a cell phone may not qualify as
such a device under § 3117.184 A true tracking device is
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 161 Side B
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179. See supra Part I.C–I.C.1. (discussing the exclusion of data from the
definition of “wire communication” if that data can be classified as information
derived from a tracking device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117).
180. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 580 (W.D. Tex.
2010).
181. CALEA Hearings, supra note 173, at 10.
182. See id.
183. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 578 (W.D. Tex.
2010).
184. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2010); see also June Hearings, supra note 10, at
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unknown to, and cannot be disabled or turned off by, the
person being tracked.185 Also, subsection (a) of § 3117 states:
“If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for
the installation of a mobile tracking device . . .”186 and refers
to a tracking devices surreptitiously installed by the
government, not devices already carried by the user.187
Judges and commentators argue that the § 3117 exception to
the definition of electronic communication applies only to
those entities that explicitly provide tracking device
services.188 Once an entity is a “provider of electronic
communications” it must provide “records or other
information” pertaining to its subscribers or customers,189 and
entities that provide tracking device services in addition to
other communications services are obliged to provide location
data when the statutory prerequisites of § 2703 are met.190
Other commentators argue the language of § 3117 above,
indicating that a “warrant or other order”191 is required,
implicitly authorizes the use of a section (d) order to acquire
historical CSLI.192 Because the application of § 3117 is
unclear, courts have sought guidance from the legislature
history of the statute.
4. Legislative History: The Scope of § 3117
Courts have analyzed the legislative history of § 3117
and more specifically Director Freeh’s testimony discussed in
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 162 Side A
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73–74 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
185. See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
187. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 73–74 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP); In re Application of the United States for
an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular
Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
188. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 73–74 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2011).
190. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 74 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
192. See In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d
448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Part. I.C.2. On one hand, the 1994 Amendments to the SCA
raised, rather than lowered, the standard of proof required to
This could
access non-content location information.193
constitute the intent of Congress to prevent disclosure of
location information except under a probable cause
standard.194 On the other hand the Third Circuit, found that
in 1994—when the standard of proof required to obtain “call
setup information” was raised—Director Freeh was
discussing the standard of proof required for a pen register or
trap-and-trace device, which is a lower standard than that for
a section (d) order.195 Because Director Freeh was discussing
a lower standard of proof than a section (d) order, by
discussion of raising the standard of proof from its existing
requirements, Freeh was referring to raising the standard to
an intermediate standard—a section (d) order.196 This is a
strong argument for which those advocates of a probable
cause standard do not have a response. Overall, it does not
appear that the tracking device definition contemplated a cell
phone or CSLI, a device that does not have to be installed, but
rather contemplated the “beepers” used in Knotts and Karo.197
Even if a court finds that historical CSLI is obtainable
under the SCA, the court must also determine if that
information is obtainable without a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment.

The majority of Fourth Amendment precedent concerning
privacy and law enforcement surveillance was decided before
the advent of devices like cell phones, which are deeply

04/16/2012 17:10:32

193. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller
Identification System on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed] and the
Production of Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 (D. Md. 2005).
194. See Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1780–81.
195. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
196. Id.
197. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
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integrated into our daily lives.198 Location data generated by
a cell phone does not comfortably fit into any Fourth
Amendment line of cases: it is difficult to simply label the
data “records” under the assumption of the risk doctrine, or to
call a cell phone just a tracking device under Knotts or
Karo.199 In fact, a cell phone is all of the above; it is a unique
device that allows a user’s movements and approximate
location to be recorded, but at the same time generates data
that is stored by a third party provider in the ordinary course
of business.
1. Is There a Search Under Katz?
In order for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated in
law enforcement requests for historical CSLI, there must first
be a search within the meaning of Katz: did the person have
an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and was that
expectation one that society is prepared to recognize as
objectively reasonable?200
Because CSLI is “hidden,
continuous, indiscriminate and intrusive” most cell phone
users are unaware that CSLI is being collected by CSPs, but
if they were, they would have a subjective expectation of
privacy in this information.201
From an objective standpoint, society holds special
privacy expectations for telephones, including cell phones,
and those expectations extend to historical CSLI.202 The
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 163 Side A
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198. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 705; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
199. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the problems in analyzing data gleaned
from a cell phone under the Knotts/Karo distinction).
200. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Douglas, J., concurring).
201. Brief for Susan Freiwald as Amici Curiae Supporting the Dist. Ct. at 8–
9, In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304
(3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4227), 2008 WL 3861766; see In re Application of the
United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and
Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F.
Supp. 2d. 571, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2010); see also In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 592-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
202. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In re Application of the
United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
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203. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 29 (2007).
204. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
205. See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006).
206. Id.
207. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 435. The Supreme Court found that
there was not an expectation of privacy with respect to helicopter fly-overs in
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455 (1989) and high power cameras in Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
208. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–362 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
209. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 439–40.
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Supreme Court in Katz based constitutional protection of
telephone calls on the overriding importance of the telephone:
“whatever people actually thought or knew about the privacy
of their telephone calls, they were entitled to believe in the
privacy of those calls, because any other result would be
destructive of society’s ability to communicate.”203 Simply
because the phone company or law enforcement could access
historical CSLI, the privacy expectation is not diminished—
there is an expectation that those parties will not do so as a
matter of course.204
On the other hand, cell phone users, through experience,
subjectively know that their location is disclosed to the
CSP.205 “Any cell phone user who has ever had a call dropped
due to a lack of service knows that their cell phone
communicates with the nearest tower.”206 In addition, the
Supreme Court has always assumed a high degree of
awareness in the American public and thus, a lack of
expectation of privacy—evidenced by the lack of reasonable
expectation of privacy in such technologies as helicopter flyovers and high-powered cameras.207
In Katz the Supreme Court emphasized a content/noncontent distinction in an objective expectation of privacy, and
in Katz, it was the content of the communication which
enjoyed an objective expectation of privacy, not the record
associated with the phone call.208 As location-based cell phone
services grow, public awareness of those services will grow as
well, and the expectation of privacy will diminish
accordingly.209
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210. Freiwald, supra note 203, ¶ 21. Having the word “reasonable” in both
the name of the test and its definition has prompted some to criticize the test as
circular: reasonable expectations are reasonable. Id. ¶ 21.
211. Id. ¶ 22.
212. Id. ¶ 23.
213. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974).
214. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (2010), reh’g en banc
denied sub nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131
S. Ct. 3064.
215. Id.
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Altogether, it is important to note that the Katz test for a
search has been criticized for both its circular reasoning and
the unfettered discretion it gives to judges in deciding
whether society objectively finds an expectation of privacy
reasonable.210 Presumably, all defendants will assert that
they had a subjective expectation of privacy, which, in effect,
turns the entire Katz analysis into an evaluation of whether
that expectation was objectively reasonable.211 However,
Courts have not created a method to determine whether
society deems an expectation of privacy to be reasonable or
not.212 Further, if Katz is taken to its logical conclusion, the
government could simply diminish reasonable expectations of
privacy by “announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we
were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive
electronic surveillance.”213
Recent case law such as United States v. Maynard shows
how an individual can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in non-content information like GPS data (or
historical CSLI) that is continuously gathered over
The content/non-content
a prolonged period of time.214
distinction of Katz is not as useful when the non-content
information gathered over an extended period of time has the
potential to reveal an intimate picture of the user’s life.215
Instead, this Comment proposes a reasonable expectation of
privacy distinction based on whether the user has actively
generated data that could convey his location through control
of his phone or if the phone has generated the data without
any activity or control by the user.
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2. Assumption of the Risk: Has a Cell Phone User
Voluntarily Conveyed His Location?

04/16/2012 17:10:32

216. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
217. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
218. Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1786.
219. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 69–70 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
220. See id.
221. See United States v. Velasquez, No. CR 08-0730, 2010 WL 4286276, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010) (analogizing to Pineda-Moreno); Brief for the United
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In addition to the Katz analysis, courts must also
determine whether historical CSLI is obtainable under the
assumption of the risk doctrine. If a cell phone user is found
to have voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI to a CSP, and
therefore assumed the risk that his CSLI could be conveyed to
law enforcement, that cell phone user would not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI.216
Because CSLI is generated automatically by the CSP
network, the voluntary decision to use a cell phone cannot be
equated with the voluntary conveyance of idle CSLI.217
Further, the “choice” to use a cell phone in today’s society is
really no choice at all, as many individuals are required to
carry cell phones for work or other legitimate purposes.218 In
addition, the substance of the records of CSLI are different
from the records voluntarily conveyed in Miller and Smith in
that the information is collected without the user’s
knowledge, and the data provides the ability to track the
user’s movements on a relatively precise and continuous
basis.219 This is in contrast to other records accessible under
the assumption of the risk doctrine (e.g. credit card, ATM,
electronic toll collection systems) where it is clear to the
person engaging in the transaction that the transaction was
being recorded, and that transaction was only a specific
moment in time.220
At the same time, historical CSLI is a record or other
information which is voluntarily conveyed to the CSP by
virtue of the use of the cell phone, leading some courts to
conclude that the user thereby assumes the risk that the
CSPs will create its own internal record and turn over this
information to the government.221 This argument focuses on
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States, supra note 161, at *28.
222. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008
WL 4200156, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008).
223. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 61–62 (statement of Richard
Littlehale, Assistant SAC, F.B.I.).
224. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426.
225. See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006).
226. An electronic toll collection service provides an electronic pass that the
user carries in his or her vehicle to automatically pay the toll as the vehicle
passes through the toll booth. Electronic Toll Collection Systems, U.S. GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104326.
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the fact that cell phone records are maintained in the course
of business, and, just like any other business, individuals do
not have a subjective expectation of privacy in those
records.222 In addition, other records, such as detailed bank
and electronic commuter pass records that reveal the location
of the consumer, are ordinarily obtainable with a court
order.223
The assumption of the risk doctrine fits comfortably
within the framework proposed by this Comment. If the
phone is in active use, the CSLI accompanying that call is
transmitted on the same frequency as the call itself and is
information voluntarily conveyed to the phone company.224 In
addition, when a user makes a call or answers a call he or she
knows that that they have conveyed their location
information in order to complete the call. As the one court
has insightfully stated, anyone who has had a call dropped
knows that his cell phone communicates with the nearest cell
tower.225 An implicit assumption in the knowledge that your
cell phone is communicating with the nearest tower is that
the cellular network knows the location of your phone,
because it knows the location of the tower that your phone is
communicating with. Thus, when a cell phone user makes or
receives a call, and knows that his phone is communicating
with the nearest cell tower, he is aware that he has conveyed
his approximate location to the CSP. Further, similar to a
credit card or electronic toll collection service,226 it is clear to
the person generating active use data that the data is being
recorded (for billing purposes) and the transaction occurred in
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only a specific moment in time.227 Because the cell phone user
has voluntarily conveyed his location information to the CSP
through the conscious physical act of making or receiving a
call, he has assumed the risk that his location information
could be turned over to law enforcement.
Idle CSLI however, truly is information that is silently
collected as an “automatic byproduct” of cell phone service
and recorded without any affirmative act by the cell phone
user, except that of turning the cell phone on.228 If the user
wants to enjoy the purpose of his cell phone, to be able to
make or receive calls, he must leave the phone on. Further,
most, if not all cell phone users are unaware that the cellular
network is calculating their location information, because
they have not taken any affirmative steps to convey that
location to the CSP. Under these circumstances a cell phone
user has not voluntarily conveyed this information to the CSP
and has an objective expectation of privacy in his or her
historical CSLI.
3. Electronic Surveillance: The Beeper Cases

If an intrusion into a legitimate expectation of privacy
takes place only once, or in limited bursts, it is still an
intrusion, and it still requires probable cause under the

04/16/2012 17:10:32

227. Cf. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 69–70 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
228. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426.
229. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
230. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 579 n.15 (W.D. Tex.
2010).
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The Supreme Court established through its decisions in
Knotts and Karo that the use of a beeper requires a warrant
when private spaces (usually the home) are implicated, but
not when the device is used to track a suspect’s movements in
public areas.229 But, how important is the home/public spaces
distinction when the “tracking device” is also a phone? Under
a strict reading of Karo, if historical CSLI may at times be
accurate enough to implicate the home, historical CSLI
requests should always require a warrant.230
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Fourth Amendment . . . there is nothing in any of the
relevant statutes that makes a distinction between limited
location information and fully robust, minute-by-minute
location information.231

Further, the uncertain nature of the accuracy of CSLI could
require a warrant to avoid a constitutional violation, because
the suspect may be unintentionally tracked in a private
location.232 In addition, even if CSLI is not dependably
accurate, a user who lives in a “palatial estate” still may have
their privacy infringed if CSLI is accurate within even 100
yards.233 Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly accurate,234
it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo,
as that information will allow law enforcement to determine
if a suspect is in his or her home.235
However, currently CSLI is not consistently accurate
enough to implicate the home of a suspect, but rather only
indicates the general area where the call was made from,
which may or may not give rise to the inference that the
defendant was at home.236 Knotts and Karo make clear that
acquiring location information about an object in the vicinity
of the home or other private space, but not within its interior,
is not a search.237 In Karo, in an incident separate from the
agents’ use of the beeper to discover that ether was located
inside the home of the defendant, the beeper was used to
discover that the ether was located somewhere in a storage
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 166 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

231. Id.
232. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 441–42.
233. Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788.
234. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the increasing accuracy of CSLI as
technology develops and more and more cell towers are erected).
235. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
236. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding there were insufficient facts to
implicate Karo); In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
80–81 (D. Mass. 2007) (concluding that historical CSLI reveals nothing more
than what could be gleaned from a pen register); In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418–19 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(finding that there was no risk of improper tracking for data from a single tower
antenna).
237. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 29.
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238. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 720 (1984).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 720–21.
241. See id.
242. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
81 (D. Mass. 2007); Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 29.
243. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
81 (D. Mass. 2007).
244. Id.
245. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
81 (D. Mass. 2007).
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facility.238 However, the beeper only indicated that the ether
was somewhere in the facility, it did not indicate the specific
locker where the ether was located.239 It was only after the
agents used their sense of smell as they walked around the
facility that they were able to detect in which storage
container the ether was located.240 The Court found that this
use of the beeper did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the beeper did not reveal anything about the contents
of the storage locker and hence was not a search of the
locker.241 This situation is similar, if not identical, to using
CSLI to discover whether the suspect is in or near his
home.242
In addition, unlike in Knotts and Karo the alleged
tracking device is not just a tracking device, but also a phone,
and analogous to Smith v. Maryland and a pen register or
trap-and-trace device.243 When a trap-and-trace device is
installed in a suspect’s home phone, the suspect’s general
location will be disclosed every time the phone is in use.244
The government may not know where the suspect is within
the home, but they will know that he (or someone in his
home) is dialing from his home phone.245
The analogy of a CSLI to a pen register seizes on an
important distinction between the devices used in Knotts and
Karo, and a cell phone. An emphasis on the privacy of the
home makes sense in the context of a tracker beeper that has
no other uses except as a tracking device, but it makes less
sense in the context of a device that has other functions, such
as making phone calls, which might also be used to determine
the location of a suspect. There is little if any difference
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246. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
247. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
248. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Compare Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788 with United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d
1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010).

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 167 Side A

between determining that a suspect who lives alone is home
when he uses his landline through a pen register or trap and
trace, and determining that he is located within the home
when he makes a call from his cell phone. While there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the home,
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in everyday
manifestations that are observable from the street246 or from
records that the party has assumed the risk will be conveyed
to law enforcement.247 These observations or records can just
as easily indicate whether or not a party is home.
In addition, unlike the tracker beepers in Knotts and
Karo, which indicated where an inanimate object was located
in the home,248 law enforcement use of historical CSLI to
determine whether a suspect is at home is no different from
the use of other external manifestations which do not require
a warrant. In Karo the police were not attempting to discover
if the suspect was at home, they were attempting to discover
whether the suspect had something within his home.249 This
is in contrast to the use of historical CSLI to determine
whether a suspect is at home—law enforcement is not
concerned with what is taking place or contained in the
interior of the home, only that the suspect is there. If,
however, law enforcement uses historical CSLI to pinpoint
where a suspect is located within the interior of his home,
this use would violate the user’s reasonable expectation of
privacy because traditional call data cannot be used for this
purpose and neither can surveillance technologies without a
warrant.250
Further, in the context of the warehouse in Karo, there
should not be a difference in Fourth Amendment protection
for an individual who lives in a small, dense housing area,
and one who lives in a “palatial estate.”251 However, as it
currently stands, the suspect who lives in the dense housing
area—where CSLI might indicate that he is at home or it
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might indicate that he is in the common area of the complex
(with no reasonable expectation of privacy)—and the suspect
in the palatial estate—where the information would likely
indicate that he was in the interior of his home—would have
different Fourth Amendment standards apply.252 The tracker
beeper cases simply do not carry over well to a tracking
device that has other uses; there is a need for a different
distinction in CSLI analysis. Additionally, in United States v.
Maynard, the Court found that the duration of the tracking is
not addressed by the Knotts and Karo cases, which has
become an important emerging issue.253
4. Prolonged Surveillance Doctrine
The prolonged surveillance doctrine announced in United
States v. Maynard254 has recently been adopted by courts
discussing CSLI and has offered an alternative analysis to
As stated in the June
the Knotts/Karo distinction.255
Congressional hearings:
I mean, if I am continuously tracked everywhere I go all
day, the fact that sometimes I am outside and sometimes I
am inside doesn’t give me comfort that it was okay to
track me during those moments I was outside . . . .
It is not were you in the house at that moment? It is are
we learning something about your continuous movement
versus learning something about you at a given moment in
time . . . .256

04/16/2012 17:10:32

252. See Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788. If the defendant were in a
small dense area where the CSLI might only indicate that he was within the
area of the apartment, this would appear to fall within the scenario of the
warehouse in Karo, whereas if the defendant were in a large palatial estate, this
would appear to fall within the holding of Karo and be an impermissible search.
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 720.
253. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the implications of the prolonged
surveillance doctrine on CSLI jurisprudence).
254. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 544 (2010), reh’g en banc
denied sub nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131
S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
255. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836–37 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
256. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 98 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger,
Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
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Advocates of the prolonged surveillance doctrine argue that
the longer an investigation runs, the more likely that
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257. Freiwald, supra note 203, ¶ 69.
258. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 98 (statement of Marc J.
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
259. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d
578, 589 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
260. See id. at 595.
261. United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010).
262. See id.
263. See id.; cf. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113,
2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (finding that while such line
drawing is arbitrary, the need for such arbitrariness and its application is
nothing new for law enforcement officers seeking to perform their duties
without running afoul of their targets’ constitutional rights).
264. See id.; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.
2010), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
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investigation will intrude upon a suspect’s privacy.257
Further, they argue that the continuous nature of the
surveillance distinguishes it from traditional methods used to
track a suspect’s movements, such as purchase receipts and
banking records or even police surveillance.258
Opponents of the prolonged surveillance doctrine point
out that there are differences between the facts of Maynard
and CSLI that warrant attention. In Maynard, GPS, a more
accurate technology, was used to track the suspect and
allowed for greater precision.259 In Maynard, the tracking
device was attached to the suspect’s car, and was therefore on
public roadways through almost the entirety of the
“surveillance,” and the suspect’s movements were tracked in
real time.260 In addition, one opponent of the prolonged
surveillance
doctrine
stated:
“Although
continuous
monitoring may capture quantitatively more information
than brief stints of surveillance, the type of information
collected is qualitatively the same.”261
Further, the prolonged surveillance doctrine has been
criticized for the vagueness that the doctrine introduces.262 At
what point does surveillance become so prolonged as to have
crossed the line into a Fourth Amendment violation?263 What
effect might this doctrine have on police visual surveillance,
for which a warrant is not required?264
The difference between the GPS used in Maynard and
CSLI, however, do not go to the heart of the issue: the
duration of tracking and the entire picture of the suspect’s life
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learned from that tracking.265 In addition, while the logistical
problems of the prolonged surveillance doctrine are real, the
point that it makes about the intrusiveness of “whole picture”
is also very real. By examining the whole of a defendant’s
movements over the course of time, the government is able to
learn more about a suspect than they would were he only
followed for one day—they learn the intimate pattern of his
life.266 For this reason this Comment advocates that as long
as historical CSLI is obtainable in active use under a section
(d) order, that the duration of data obtainable be limited in
time. Requests for anywhere from sixty to one hundred days
are too intrusive into the life of a suspect.267
The active/idle use distinction proposed by this Comment
would preserve and implement the prolonged surveillance
doctrine of Maynard. Active use data, obtainable under a
section (d) order, would only include the limited instances in
which a suspect dialed or received a call. This data, unlike
idle use data, is not continuous, as even the most frequent cell
phone user is not on his phone twenty-four hours a day. By
limiting data obtainable without a warrant to the limited
instances where a cell phone user makes or receives a call, in
conjunction with a limit on the number of days over which the
information can be obtained, this Comment’s proposal avoids
the prolonged surveillance concerns of Maynard.
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265. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
266. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 544 (2010), reh’g en banc
denied sub nom; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131
S. Ct. 3064 (2011); see, e.g., Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move and
You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011,) http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html (demonstrating the information that
is generated through historical CSLI, including an interactive map).
267. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113,
2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011); In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010)
(reviewing an order requesting historical CSLI for 113 days prior to the date of
the order); In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reviewing an order
requesting historical CSLI and call detail records for sixty days prior to the date
of the Order).

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 169 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

5_FRASER FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/15/2012 8:03:15 PM

HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION

615

III. PROPOSAL
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268. See September Hearings, supra note 19, at 1–2; supra Part II.A
(discussing the problems with the current statutory framework governing
historical CSLI disclosure).
269. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the problems that are encountered
when trying to fit CSLI into the Knotts/Karo analysis).
270. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that a wire
communication is an “aural transfer”).
272. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the distinction between wire
communication and electronic communication).
273. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the tracking device exception to the
definition of electronic communication).
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Technology has outpaced existing statutes and Fourth
Amendment Precedent, leading to conflicting legal standards
that create uncertainty for law enforcement and courts.268 In
addition, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
governing the voluntary disclosure of records and other cases
governing electronic surveillance does not assimilate well to a
device like a cell phone, which both creates ordinary business
records and allows for location-based surveillance.269 This
Comment proposes a new legislative and Fourth Amendment
distinction: active-use CSLI, data generated when the call is
made (or received) and when the call is ended, would be
obtainable under a section (d) order; whereas idle CSLI, data
generated by the cellular network in order to locate the cell
phone if and when a call is made, would be obtainable only
under a probable cause standard.
This framework
comfortably fits within the current existing definitions of the
SCA, as the active/idle use distinction helps to resolve the
issue
of
whether
historical
CSLI
is
a
wire
communication or an electronic communication. Active use
data, the data generated during the call,270 qualifies as a wire
communication271 and idle use data fits the definition of
an electronic communication.272 Further, this distinction
preserves the existing tracking device exception to electronic
communication.273 Application of the active use framework to
the SCA can best be accomplished by legislation mandating
that CSPs keep limited CSLI records and unlimited CSLI
records separate and distinct. Legislation regulating what
kind of location information generated by cell phones can be
stored and under what circumstances has been enacted by
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274. See Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L
201) 37–47.
275. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 155–56 (statement of Electronic
Privacy Information Center).
276. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on Maynard. The outcome of
this decision could greatly shape CSLI jurisprudence as well.
277. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979).
278. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the how CSLI fits into the assumption
of the risk framework).
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other governments, most notably the European Union.274
This legislation can provide the Legislature with a possible
model to protect location information.275
In addition, the active use framework tries to strike the
appropriate balance in current Fourth Amendment precedent.
The content/non-content distinction of Katz is not useful in
the context of historical CSLI when the non-content
information generated over a prolonged period of time has the
potential to reveal an intimate picture of the cell phone user’s
life and implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy under
Maynard.276 Instead, the active use framework proposes a
reasonable expectation of privacy distinction based on
whether the user of the phone is actively conveying their
location to the CSP by virtue of making or receiving a call, or
if the phone has generated data without any control by the
user.
The active use distinction also helps to adapt the
assumption of the risk framework to historical CSLI
jurisprudence. Active use CSLI, those records that the user
actively generates by making and receiving calls, is more
closely analogous to landline phone records that do not
require a warrant under the assumption of the risk
framework.277 However, idle use data which is silently and
continuously collected by the cellular network without any
action by the cell phone user would require a warrant as it
more appropriately falls outside of the assumption-of-the-risk
framework.278
Also, the active use distinction tries to reconcile the
holdings of Knotts and Karo with the fact that landline phone
records can, and do, provide police officers with information
regarding a suspect’s location.
Instead of analyzing a
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279. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
280. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reviewing an order
requesting historical CSLI and call detail records for sixty days prior to the date
of the Order).
281. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
Congress in the recent hearings regarding the ECPA and communications
technologies).
282. See supra Part II (analyzing the problems with the existing statutory
framework and Fourth Amendment precedent).
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reasonable expectation of privacy based on where the user is
when the information is collected, this Comment proposes a
distinction based on whether the user is actively controlling,
or instead if the cellular network is gathering the user’s
location information while the phone is idle However, if law
enforcement uses historical CSLI to pinpoint where a suspect
is located within the interior of his home, this use would
violate the user’s reasonable expectation of privacy under
Karo because traditional call data or other police surveillance
cannot be used for this purpose and neither can other
surveillance technologies.279
Lastly, this proposal finds the prolonged surveillance
doctrine of United States v. Maynard persuasive and
advocates for legislative changes that would curtail the
window of time within which law enforcement could gain
access to historical CSLI records, regardless of whether active
or idle use.280 Active use data, obtainable under a section (d)
order, would only include the limited instances in which a
suspect dialed or received a call. By limiting data obtainable
under a section (d) order to instances in which the suspect
dials or receives a call, the proposal of this Comment hopes to
avoid the prolonged surveillance concerns of Maynard.
This proposal strikes the appropriate balance sought by
Congress.281 It balances the privacy of the user in his or her
movements when not actively using their cell phone against
the needs of law enforcement to build a case and gather
information. In addition, this framework provides a bright
line rule for courts to follow; no longer must the court
speculate how accurate the data is in order to determine
whether or not the privacy of the home is implicated, or
struggle with a statute that does not mesh with current uses
of technology.282
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283. Rachelle Dragan, US Senate Sinks its Teeth into Online Privacy Reform,
TECHNEWSWORLD (July 7, 2011), http://www.technewsworld.com/story
/72477.html.
284. Press, Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Introduces Benchmark
Bill To Update Key Digital Privacy Law, SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (July 16,
2011)
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=b6d1f687-f2f748a4-80bc-29e3c5f758f2.
285. Id.
286. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site
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As stated above, in May 2011 Senator Leahy of the
Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a bill in the U.S.
Senate to update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
including the SCA.283 The proposed legislation, as currently
written, would allow law enforcement to obtain historical
CSLI under either a search warrant or a section (d) order.284
A summary of the proposed changes prepared by Senator
Leahy states that the new statutory language “codifies the
government’s current practice for obtaining this kind of
location information.”285
Without more information, the exact implications of
allowing law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI under
either a search warrant or a section (d) order remain unclear.
It is uncertain from the statutory language or the
accompanying summary by Senator Leahy if the Third
Circuit’s ruling that a finding of specific and articulable facts
is necessary but not sufficient is still valid. If the government
has the necessary proof to meet the specific and articulable
facts standard, must the court grant the government’s
request, or can the court, in its discretion, require law
enforcement to obtain a warrant?
Additionally, although the proposed legislation may
settle the current disagreement regarding the standard for
law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI under the SCA,
whether law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment would still remain unsettled.
Recent decisions have denied government requests for
historical CSLI not under the SCA, but the Fourth
Amendment, either because historical CSLI can be accurate
enough to implicate constitutionally protected privacy of the
home under Knotts and Karo or under the prolonged
surveillance doctrine of Maynard.286 The proposed legislation
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would not settle these issues and the Fourth Amendment
implications of historical CSLI data will likely remain a
subject of litigation in courts.
B. Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Jones
The Supreme Court reached a decision in United States
v. Jones (formerly Maynard) shortly before publication of this
Comment. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia,
held that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on
the defendant’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.287 The Court reached this result by
replying upon common-law trespass jurisprudence instead of
applying the Katz analysis.288
However, in dicta the Court discussed whether the
Government’s use of a GPS device to monitor a defendant’s
movements might also have violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights under Katz.289 The small portion of
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion to discuss this issue focused
on the duration of the tracking.290 Justice Scalia rejected any
distinction between short-term and long-term GPS
monitoring, stating that such analysis leads to “additional
thorny problems.”291
In his concurring opinion,292 Justice Alito indicated that
under the Katz analysis he would hold that “relatively short
term monitoring” of a person’s movements on public streets
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 171 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d.
571, 572 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
287. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 2012 WL 171117, at *3 (S. Ct. Jan.
23, 2012)
288. Id. at *3–4. The Court in Jones stated that “[t]he Government
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted”.
Id. at *3.
289. Id. at *7–8.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. The bulk of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion critiques Justice Scalia’s
use of common law trespass jurisprudence instead of the Katz analysis to decide
the issue. Id. at *11–16 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Jones, 2012 WL 171117, *17 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at *9 (Sotomayer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at *10
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Jones, 2012 WL 171117, at *3–8.
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293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
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do not violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy whereas longer term GPS monitoring would.293
Justice Alito declined to create a standard for how long GPS
monitoring must continue until it implicates a suspect’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, stating that “[w]e need not
indentify with precision the point at which the tracking of
this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed
before the 4-week mark.”294
Justice Sotomayor, who joined Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion but also wrote her own concurring opinion, took the
strongest stance on the use of GPS devices to monitor a
suspect. Justice Sotomayor stated that she believed even
shot-term monitoring could violate an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.295 She continued by expressing her
belief that the low cost and wide availability of GPS trackers
could have such a dramatic effect on American society so as to
“chill[] associational and expressive freedoms.”296 Finally,
Justice Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties,” on the grounds that the assumption of the risk
framework was “ill suited to the digital age in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”297
While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of
Jones will be, the Court’s narrow holding that the installation
and use of the GPS device was a search provides little
guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain
historical CSLI records. First, with respect to cell phones, the
government does not have to install the device used to
generate location information—the user is already carrying
around his or her cell phone.298 Second, the Court did not
explain what level of proof is required to conduct the “search”
that occurred in Jones.299 The Court expressly declined to
address the Government’s argument that the police officers
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had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the
search on the grounds that the argument was not raised
below.300 This has lead at least one commentator to wonder if
the Court could later find that the search caused by installing
a GPS device requires only reasonable suspicion.301
Third, the court has not fashioned any of kind of
standard as to when the monitoring of a person’s movements
begins to impinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion attempts to make a
distinction between short-term and long-term GPS
monitoring, but then he declines to articulate a standard to
differentiate between the two categories. Justice Alito simply
states that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week
mark.”302 Until many of the questions left open by Jones are
answered, the Court’s decision may only add to the confusion
and lack of clarity that currently persists in historical CSLI
jurisprudence. The proposal for this Comment, to distinguish
between active and idle use data, could help to provide a more
discernable standard for when a warrant is or is not required
for law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI records.
CONCLUSION
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300. Id. at *8.
301. Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The government
fared much better than everyone realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 26, 2010, 10:20
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/reactions-to-jones-v-united-states-thegovernment-fared-much-better-than-everyone-realizes/.
302. Jones, 2012 WL 171117, at *27 (Alito, J., concurring).
303. See supra Part III.
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Cell phones have changed the way that people
communicate with each other, but they also generate a
wealth of personal information about where we have gone and
to whom we have communicated with. The current statutory
framework for law enforcement access to historical CSLI is
out of date, contains internal contradictions, and is presently
the subject of litigation in courts.303 Additionally, existing
Fourth Amendment precedent does not adequately balance
the privacy expectations of users with respect to a device that
both conveys their location and generates records in the
ordinary course of business. The result of these shortcomings
is that courts have struggled to analogize historical CSLI to
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normal business records or to a tracking device, when in fact
it is both.
By proposing a new distinction between when the phone
is in active use and when it is idle, this Comment hopes to
provide a new, unambiguous legal framework that will help
provide the legislature and courts with a test that adequately
balances the privacy of the cell phone user with the
reasonable expectations of society, and law enforcement’s
need to protect the public. As technology and its uses change,
so must our statutes and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
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